In its landmark 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO identified three essential core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The first two are fairly self-explanatory, but the third was an important advance. The notion of collective security as a core task begins with the recognition that NATO is “affected by and can influence political and security developments beyond its borders”. For this reason, the Alliance seeks partnerships with other countries and organisations to strengthen international security. The Alliance’s relations with the Indo-Pacific countries are prime examples, and for years after 2010, this task was seen primarily as supporting non-Article 5 crisis management operations.

Today, however, NATO is adapting its partnerships to respond to changing structural realities and the emphasis on strategic competition in the face of the increasing assertiveness and militarism of revisionist states such as Russia and China.

In this sense, there have been significant qualitative changes in the way NATO’s partnerships with the individual countries of the Indo-Pacific Group (IP4) – Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea – and the minilateral network function and the challenges they face today compared to when they were founded. Both sides now view their respective partners as important for their own defence and deterrence, rather than as facilitators in ensuring security for third parties, as was the case with missions outside their own territory, where crisis management and cooperative security were the central organising principles of these partnerships.

NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific

The NATO Summit in Washington last month demonstrated that IP4 countries play a central role in the ecosystem of NATO Partner countries. This role was first evident in its current form at the 2022 Summit in Madrid, where NATO’s current strategic concept was presented. Substantive engagement between NATO and IP4 countries has evolved since then. This year’s Summit, for example, was the third consecutive year attended by IP4 leaders, demonstrating that this informal grouping is becoming a mainstay of NATO’s rapprochement and strategic thinking on the Indo-Pacific.

The Strategic Concept 2022 describes the Indo-Pacific as “important for NATO, as developments in this region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security.” Such a diagnosis of the international security situation is consistent with the general assessment of trends from Canberra, Tokyo, Seoul and Wellington, which have also witnessed first-hand the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine in their region. In addition, the Strategic Concept identifies China’s ambitions and policies as major challenges to the Alliance’s security, interests and values. It also raises concerns about increased cooperation between China and Russia, which threatens to undermine the rules-based international order. The Washington Summit Declaration released on July 10 also underlined that these trends have increased in pace and magnitude, with North Korea and Iran providing direct military support to Russia.

In response, the coordination and operational channels between NATO and the IP4 have become even more important for the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific and provide a strong common basis for cooperation. However, reaching consensus within the Alliance on engagement has not been easy due to some significant differences of opinion among the 32 Allies.

At the summit in Washington, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stressed the “strong and deepening cooperation” between the Alliance and the IP4. Symbolic of the greater ambitions behind NATO-IP4 cooperation is the transition to the agreements of the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme, which replaced the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme and which all IP4 countries signed last year.

In addition, NATO aims to work with these partners as a minilateral group rather than as a collection of four individual partnerships. This engagement has resulted in four joint projects announced by US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in July that will focus on supporting Ukraine, artificial intelligence, countering disinformation and cybersecurity.

At the same time, IP4 countries have continuously demonstrated their commitment to Euro-Atlantic security by providing military and economic assistance to Ukraine, imposing sanctions on Russia, and initiating a range of direct and indirect capacity-building initiatives. Some of the leaders of IP4 members, such as Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, have even urged U.S. lawmakers to continue to help Ukraine.

The future of NATO-IP4 cooperation

If well managed, NATO’s IP4 partnerships can be an important tool for strengthening the Alliance’s core missions in cooperative security and crisis management. More importantly, these partnerships have the potential to contribute to NATO’s defence and deterrence, enhance the Alliance’s competitive advantages and shape the global security environment in ways that serve its interests and values.

To be successful, NATO must recognise and take into account the range of ambitions for cooperation among IP4 partners. The Alliance should adapt its approach and maximise the benefits of cooperation at different levels. For countries with lower ambitions, the benefits of cooperation with NATO come primarily from political consultations, and these discussions should continue. These consultations promote a shared strategic awareness and improve understanding of how events in one region affect the security of other regions.

Those with greater ambitions to strengthen relations with NATO should focus on expanding cooperation in science and technology. This includes capacity building, which can have a significant positive impact on the security of NATO and its partners. With sufficient political will and consensus on both sides, individual IP4 partners can further develop their relations with NATO. This cooperation could then lead to achieving, strengthening and maintaining interoperability – that is, operating together according to agreed rules and procedures and using similar equipment. It could also mean working together to set international standards and jointly produce and maintain military assets, and expanding existing cooperation between NATO and its partners in other initiatives.

The NATO IP4 format has already proven useful for sharing information and providing a united front to promote shared values ​​against revisionist states. The Alliance should build on the important groundwork already done to integrate the IP4 into various NATO structures and processes to continue multi-party coordination and to “regulate” these partnerships to insulate them from domestic politics. Given that Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns have spread the narrative that NATO is seeking to expand into the Indo-Pacific, it is critical for the Alliance to consistently stress that the partnerships with IP4 states or future potential partners from the region are not a prelude to full membership.

While it may seem obvious, managing and aligning expectations is crucial because NATO operates on a consensus basis. Given past disagreements among Allies over NATO expansion into the Indo-Pacific, it is therefore imperative to manage these relationships carefully to avoid unnecessary tensions within the Alliance and to demonstrate how maintaining relations with the IP4 serves the interests of both sides.

Gorana Grgić is a nonresident senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

75th anniversary of NATO is a milestone in a remarkable story of reinvention, adaptation and unity. As the Alliance seeks to secure its future for the next 75 years, however, it faces revanchism from old rivals, escalating strategic competition and uncertainties about the future of the rules-based international order.

As partners and allies turn their attention from celebration to challenges, the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative has invited contributors to address the most pressing issues ahead of the historic summit in Washington and chart a path for the Alliance’s future. This series includes seven essays focusing on specific issues NATO must address at the Washington summit, as well as five essays addressing the longer-term challenges the Alliance must address to ensure transatlantic security.

further reading

Image: The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Ralph Johnson and the Halifax-class frigate HMCS Montreal of the Royal Canadian Navy conduct bilateral operations in the East China Sea, July 30, 2024. Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Jamaal Liddell/US Navy.