FORT JOHNSON, Louisiana— The only sign of the drone was its moped-like whine, the noise of which waxed and waned as it circled above soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division during an exercise deep behind enemy lines last week.

But somewhere above, the soldiers playing the enemy were watching – a unit called Geronimo.

Most soldiers had no choice but to sit around and wait. For the 101st’s Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company, it was an opportunity to test their equipment. Within minutes, a soldier had turned on the Bal Chatri, a portable drone detector previously issued only to special operations soldiers.

The only problem: the detector found nothing. First Lieutenant Adam Hendrick, commander of a platoon within the MFRC, suspected that the Bal Chatri did not pick up the drone because it was of American design and therefore marked as safe.

This is precisely the information the MFRC is designed to collect. The new unit – which was created in March and is one of only three similar units in the entire Army – is tasked with testing new technologies in real-world conditions and developing new, innovative doctrines.

Over the course of five days Defense One watched the MFRC use its superior technology against Geronimo’s experienced “enemy” soldiers in 250,000 acres of pine forest, even as temperatures soared above 90 degrees and humidity exceeded 60 percent. Although the battle was fake – kills were recorded via a laser tag-like system – the blank-firing weapons the soldiers used often gave the impression of a real battle.

Transformation in contact

The MFRC has the very latest technology: commercial drones, anti-drone technology, electronic warfare tools, command and control software, deception devices, hypermobile vehicles and more.

It’s different for most Army units. For years, the Army distributed its equipment the way it distributed uniforms: everyone got the same thing. The problem is that distributing technology this way can take years and has led to the deployment of drones that were literally museum pieces.

To overcome the delays, the Army developed a “transformation-in-contact” deployment strategy in which the unit rapidly deploys small units but a wide range of new technologies to three selected brigades. Although each brigade has a version of the MFRC, the MFRC is the furthest along in its “transformation process,” said a PAO with the 101st Airborne Division.

Much of the new technology is inspired by equipment and tactics used in Ukraine. “There is so much to learn from the Ukrainians, and a lot of it comes down to integrating new things, like the proliferation of drones,” said Maj. Gen. Brett Sylvia, commander of the 101st Airborne Division.

Rather than just testing the equipment on controlled firing ranges, the Army also wants to push its technology and doctrine to the limits by having soldiers use it in realistic training scenarios and in the field.

This realism can begin on day one: Defense One joined the MFRC’s parent unit, the 2nd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, as they flew by helicopter 500 miles over fueling stations to the training area. The attack was one of the largest and longest airstrikes ever conducted in a training exercise, Sylvia said: “Nobody has ever done anything from this distance and on this scale.”

After a midnight landing in scorching heat, the soldiers began testing their equipment in a two-week battle against Geronimo.

The MFRC

Currently, the MFRC consists of three reconnaissance platoons, referred to as “hunter-killer” platoons, a drone and electronic warfare platoon, and a robotics and autonomous systems platoon, which is responsible for operating ground robots and drones. Although the unit was only formed in March, its rotation during JRTC week is its first time at a combat training center, an important part of preparing for deployment.

The Hunter-Killer platoons each have up to six commercially available short-range drones, a mix of Skydio, Parrot and Vesper models. The new technology brings a major culture change. While other drone operators have previously said replacing drones is challenging, the MFRC is allowed to experiment as needed without worrying about potential damage, said Sgt. 1st Class Mitchell Poalson.

And when the Hunter-Killer platoon finds a target with its Parrot drone, it can use an artificial intelligence called Sentinel AI to make recommendations for the best angle of a cannon to take out the target. The new technology reduces the time it takes to destroy a target from up to eight minutes to “less than a minute,” said Capt. Charlie O’Hagan, commander of the MFRC.

Each platoon also has a control station for the Switchblade 600, a combat bomb capable of taking out tanks, and a soldier trained to fly a Switchblade. The actual Switchblades are kept in the Brigade’s operations center and fired toward the target before the Hunter-Killer platoon takes control of the drone in the final phase.

Thanks to its switchblades, the MFRC also reduces the time it takes to attack a target. When a reconnaissance unit spots an enemy force, it must typically contact headquarters by radio and wait for the staff to make a decision on how to proceed. With the switchblade, the approval process for attacks on targets with a high chance of winning – like Geronimo’s vehicle commander – is simplified, said 1st Lt. Noah Paffenroth, commander of another MFRC platoon.

Geronimo also has drones – but the train is prepared for these too. Each train is equipped with a Dronebuster jamming rifle and a Bal-Chatri drone detector.

The picture is rounded off by electronic warfare capabilities, with platoons carrying the Beast+ backpack, which can detect the position of radar devices.

Some of the equipment is homemade: Paffenroth showed small bags containing several Raspberry Pi microcomputers, each just a few centimeters tall. The computers mimic the hubs of a command post, from printers to projectors. Paffenroth said the plan was to hang them in trees and then walk away, luring Geronimo, who would target them and reveal their weapons positions.

The unit’s RAS platoon has even more advanced capabilities. The platoon features the C100 drone as a drone bomber, as well as the SMET ground robot, the STEED-powered wheelbarrow, and other anti-drone technology.

All of the MFRC’s capabilities are brought together by a variety of new command and control devices. Each senior platoon officer and noncommissioned officer wears a chest-worn Android phone with the Tactical Assault Kit (TAK), an open-source mapping software that allows soldiers to mark their position and enemies, track friendly air support, and communicate by voice or text.

The trains are also equipped with MUOS satellite radio terminals that can operate via TAK as well as more traditional radio formats such as HF.

All of this is transported by the Army’s new Infantry Squad Vehicle, a squat, Mad Max-like truck based on the Chevrolet Colorado. The vehicle’s storage space allows reconnaissance units that previously could only be deployed for three days to now be deployed for up to six days, said Sergeant David Warren.

Learning difficulties

However, the new equipment brings with it some challenges.

Soldiers must be cautious with the TAK system because it requires a WiFi puck whose signal can be detected, so units try to use it sparingly during dedicated communications windows.

The new equipment may also require frequent troubleshooting that goes far beyond infantry training, Paffenroth said. Electronic warfare soldiers are better able to handle this work, but may struggle with the physical fitness required for 24-hour operations deep behind enemy lines. The Army could wait until the technology matures — but then it risks being “five years behind,” Paffenroth said.

And while an app built into TAK should allow the MFRC to stream footage from Skydio drones directly to commanders or artillery units, the unit hasn’t gotten that to work yet, Paffenroth said. Ukrainian units can easily do that by using Chinese-made DJI drones in conjunction with Google Meet — an option not available to U.S. troops.

The Dronebuster also has problems, soldiers said: Unless the drone is nearby and moves slowly, the jammer’s relatively narrow cone of interference is not sufficient to disable it.

Army safety regulations also occasionally got in the way of the tests. Soldiers were not allowed to fly their drones when helicopters were in the air, even if they had a clear view of the drone. So during the first two days of the exercise, when Chinook and Apache helicopters filled the skies, the soldiers had little opportunity to fly their drones.

But even a short flight can bring great rewards. Just one day later, Hendrick’s platoon was able to launch a drone and discover three of Geronimo’s artillery pieces in a nearby field.

They then called their brigade headquarters, which coordinated a simulated attack by a highly mobile artillery rocket system, destroying all three guns, O’Hagan said.

In fact, the brigade destroyed 29 Geronimo devices within a day of landing its troops, O’Hagan said. Each of these targets was controlled from small drones and used simulated indirect fire like artillery.

“The days of having to get up close and put a soldier in harm’s way are over,” O’Hagan said. “We want to use this equipment to reduce the risk of violence.”